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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the empirical relevance of banking market structure on
growth. There is substantial evidence of a positive relationship between the level of
development of the banking sector of an economy and its long-run output growth.
Little is known, however, about the role played by the market structure of the
banking sector on the dynamics of capital accumulation. This paper provides
evidence that bank concentration promotes the growth of those industrial sectors
that are more in need of external ﬁnance by facilitating credit access to younger
ﬁrms. However, we also ﬁnd evidence of a general depressing eﬀect on growth
associated with a concentrated banking industry, which impacts all sectors and all
ﬁrms indiscriminately.
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or Morningstar, Inc.The importance of ﬁnancial development for economic growth has been extensively ana-
lyzed in recent years. The amount of credit that the banking sector makes available for
productive uses is one of the most signiﬁcant measures of ﬁnancial development. Such
an indicator of size of the banking sector has been shown to have a signiﬁcant, positive
eﬀect on growth. In this paper we study whether for a given size, the market structure of
the banking sector has empirical relevance for economic growth. If it is agreed that the
size of the banking sector is important to capital accumulation, does it matter whether
the underlying industry structure is unconcentrated, thus approximating perfectly com-
petitive conditions, or whether instead market power is concentrated among few banking
institutions?
We ﬁnd that concentration in the banking sector determines a general deadweight
loss which depresses growth. However, we also ﬁnd evidence that bankconcentration
promotes the growth of those industries that are more in need of external ﬁnance by
facilitating credit access to ﬁrms, especially younger ones.
There are theoretical reasons, as well as anecdotal evidence, suggesting that the mar-
ket structure of the banking sector has a non-trivial impact on the process of capital
accumulation. Conventional wisdom suggests that any departure from perfect competi-
tion in the credit market introduces ineﬃciencies that would harm ﬁrms’ access to credit,
thus hindering growth. Pagano (1993), for example, shows this eﬀect in a simple endoge-
nous growth model. On the other hand, some recent contributions have pointed out that
banks with monopoly power have a greater incentive to establish lending relationships
with their client ﬁrms, thus facilitating their access to credit lines. Mayer (1988), Mayer
(1990) and Petersen and Rajan (1995) highlight this potential incompatibility between
bankcompetition and the establishment of close lending relationships.
There is some historical evidence on the positive role of concentrated credit markets
for economic development. Gerschenkron (1965), for example, mentions the importance
1of institutions such as the Credit Mobilier for the industrialization of France, or that
of the Great Banks for Germany’s development. Cohen (1967) explains the similar role
played by Banca Commerciale Italiana and Credito Italiano for Italy, two banks whose
combined assets accounted for about 60 percent of the total market. Likewise, Sylla
(1969) argues that monopoly-enhancing regulation in the ﬁnancial sector at the time of
the Civil War contributed to industrialization in the United States. By the same token,
Mayer (1990) mentions how Japan’s post-war development has been boosted by their
main-banksystem.
While the arguments on both sides of this theoretical debate are compelling, no
broad-scope, cross-country empirical study has been conducted to test either stance. In
this paper we choose to take an agnostic position on the issue in order to explore the
consistency of each theory with the available data.1
This paper contributes to the recent line of empirical research on ﬁnancial interme-
diation and growth. Following the original contributions by Goldsmith (1969), Gurley
and Shaw (1967), McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973), economists in recent years have
returned to this problem. Among the newer contributions, King and Levine (1993)
present the ﬁrst broad, cross-country analysis of the importance of various indicators of
ﬁnancial development. They ﬁnd that countries initially endowed with a more sizeable
credit sector experienced faster growth in the following thirty years. Also using cross-
country regression analysis, Levine and Zervos (1998) make an important reﬁnement by
showing the joint, independent relevance for growth of both banks and capital markets.
1Petersen and Rajan (1995) present some indirect empirical evidence analyzing credit availability
for a cross-section of U.S. small businesses located in markets characterized by diﬀerent degrees of bank
concentration. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms are less credit constrained in more concentrated banking markets,
and younger ﬁrms are charged lower loan rates. Shaﬀer (1998), on the other hand, ﬁnds evidence
from cross-sectional U.S. data that household income grows faster in markets with a higher number
of banks. In two very recent contributions, Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2000), using cross-
industry, cross-provinces Italian data, ﬁnd that ﬁrms in more informationally opaque sectors grow more
in more concentrated banking markets, while Black and Strahan (2000), with cross-state U.S. data ﬁnd
a negative relationship between banking concentration and the number of new ﬁrms.
2Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) use instead ﬁrm-level data and show, in a cross-
country study, that where the legal system is more developed ﬁrms have greater access
to external funds, which in turn allows them to grow faster. Meanwhile, Rajan and
Zingales (1998) render an innovative contribution to the ﬁeld by focusing on a cross-
industry, cross-country analysis. First, they construct a measure of the dependence on
external ﬁnance of a wide range of industrial sectors, in which diﬀerences among sectors
depend mainly on technology-speciﬁc factors.2 Second, they test whether industries that
are more dependent on external ﬁnance grow faster in countries that are more ﬁnancially
developed. They ﬁnd that this is indeed the case, thus providing evidence conﬁrming
the overall importance of ﬁnancial development on growth.
Our paper tests the importance of banking market structure for growth. We use
an extension of the Rajan and Zingales data set, with both cross-industry and cross-
country characteristics. Similar to the approach taken by King and Levine or Levine
and Zervos, we begin by evaluating the total, average eﬀect of bankconcentration on
industrial growth. That is, we test whether, by and large, industries grow more or less
if they are in countries with a more concentrated banking sector. Given the opposing
theoretical views described earlier, the answer to this question is not obvious. On the
one hand, if bankconcentration simply results in lower credit availability, then growth
should be slower in countries with a more concentrated banking market. On the other
hand, if the market power associated with bank concentration generates positive eﬀects
by enhancing the formation of lending relationships, then growth should be faster in
countries with a concentrated banking sector. We ﬁnd that bank concentration has an
average depressive eﬀect on industry growth.
However, our empirical study goes beyond the analysis of this average eﬀect of bank
2For example, an industrial sector at high R&D intensity is expected to rely more on external sources
of ﬁnance than other, more traditional, sectors (e.g. Computing or Chemical products as opposed to
Tobacco or Leather).
3market structure. As remarked by Rajan and Zingales, industries diﬀer among each
other in terms of their relative dependence on external sources of ﬁnance. Again, given
the opposing theoretical views one might expect that ﬁrms in sectors especially depen-
dent on external ﬁnance should suﬀer more, and therefore grow less than average, when
faced with a concentrated banking sector. On the other hand, if bank concentration en-
hances the formation of lending relationships, then one could expect that precisely those
ﬁrms in industries especially dependent on external ﬁnance should beneﬁt disproportion-
ately more when faced with a concentrated banking sector. Exploiting industry-speciﬁc
information, we thus askwhether bankconcentration has a heterogeneous impact across
industrial sectors.
The tests we carry out are actually even more precise: corporate ﬁnance theory
suggests that ﬁrms’ relative age may aﬀect their dependence on external ﬁnance. For
example, Rajan and Zingales show that, in median terms, U.S. ﬁrms raise a positive
amount of external ﬁnance only up to the tenth year of their life. Therefore, one would
expect to ﬁnd stronger evidence of either eﬀect of bankconcentration by focusing the
analysis speciﬁcally on the external ﬁnancial needs of younger ﬁrms. Since the data
set provides separate information on the ﬁnancial needs of ﬁrms less than ten years
old and on the more mature ones, we are able to do that. Therefore, our empirical
test is: all else equal, do industries whose younger ﬁrms are especially dependent on
external ﬁnance grow more or less rapidly in countries where the banking sector is
highly concentrated? The results show robust evidence that industries in which young
ﬁrms are more dependent on external ﬁnance will in fact grow relatively faster in those
countries where the banking sector is more concentrated.
The two results are not in contradiction. On the contrary, taken together they allow
us to conﬁrm the basic predictions of both theories of banking market structure and
growth: a more concentrated banking industry imposes a deadweight loss in the credit
4market as a whole, resulting in a reduction in the total quantity of loanable funds, exactly
as conventional wisdom would suggest. However, subjecting to more careful scrutiny
the complexity of the microeconomic relationship between ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial needs and
sources of ﬁnance, we also ﬁnd evidence that the eﬀect is heterogeneous across industrial
sectors, and that in fact, speciﬁc categories of ﬁrms and industries seem to beneﬁt from
a concentrated banking sector.
In the next section we describe in more detail the theory behind our empirical study.
Section II contains the illustration of the models used for hypothesis testing. In Section
III we describe the data set. The empirical results are presented in Section IV, while
Sections V and VI contain a large variety of robustness tests. In Section VII we present
various reﬁnements of the analysis, while Section VIII elaborates on the several policy
implications associated with the results of our investigation and presents concluding
remarks.
I. Theoretical Background
The negative eﬀect of banking market power is a direct application of standard re-
sults from market theory. Banks with monopoly power would determine, with respect
to perfect competition, an equilibrium with higher loan rates and a smaller quantity of
loanable funds. This would clearly reduce economic growth. Conversely, the positive
eﬀect derives from the greater incentive for monopolistic banks to establish lending re-
lationships, which in turn promotes ﬁrms’ access to investment funds. According to the
model developed in Petersen and Rajan (1995), a bankwill establish lending relation-
ships with young ﬁrms with no record of performance, thus bearing initial informational
costs, if it can share in their future stream of proﬁts, should they turn out to be success-
ful. However, in highly competitive credit markets, a bank knows that it may not be able
to maintain a tie with the successful ﬁrms: once these ﬁrms are established they will seek
the lowest-cost supply of credit available in the market. Banks that did not invest initial
5resources in funding the unknown ﬁrms would have a cost advantage in oﬀering better
credit conditions than the bankattempting to recoup the original cost. In the presence
of this free-riding problem, competition in banking can induce credit rationing in the
sense that potentially high quality (but young and unknown) entrepreneurs may not get
funded (for similar analyses of externalities in information production and credit market
competition see also Lang and Nakamura (1989) and Cetorelli and Peretto (2000)).
This theoretical argument is implicitly based on an assumption of market incom-
pleteness. For example, a possible solution to the free-riding problem under competition
would be to allow banks to hold equity positions. Under this scenario, the bank would
participate in future proﬁt sharing regardless of whether the ﬁrm maintains a lending
relationship. In fact, one can argue that monopoly power gives the bankan implicit
equity stake in the ﬁrm it is ﬁnancing. Regulatory restrictions, however, may prevent a
bankfrom writing equity contracts. We explore how the degree of regulatory restrictions




The ﬁrst model explores the role of bankconcentration for industrial growth at large,
that is, regardless of speciﬁc industry characteristics. We write our basic growth equation
as,
Growthj,k = Constant +Ψ 1 · Industry dummiesj (1)
+Ψ 2 · Country controlsk
+ ψ3 · Industry share of manufacturing value addedj,k
+ ψ4 · Bank concentrationk
6+ Errorj,k,
where a subscript j indicates that the variable refers to the j-th industry. Similarly,
a subscript k indicates a variable regarding the k-th country. Uppercase coeﬃcients
indicate vectors.
The industry dummies correct for industry-speciﬁc eﬀects. The country controls,
among which is the level of bankdevelopment, are regressors customarily used in cross-
country growth studies that we include to reduce the possibility of model mispeciﬁcation
due to the omission of important variables. The entire vector of country control variables
is described in greater detail in the presentation of the empirical results.
The j industries in the data set all belong to manufacturing.3 Similar to the role
played by per-capita income in standard cross-country growth equations, the industry
j share of total value added in manufacturing in country k, calculated at the beginning
of the period, captures an industry-speciﬁc convergence eﬀect: sectors that have already
grown substantially in the past are unlikely to continue to grow at a high rate in the
future. Therefore, ψ3 is expected to have a negative sign.
Finally, the level of bankconcentration isolates the total eﬀect of bankmark et struc-
ture on industrial growth. As we mentioned above, theory suggests that there are two
opposing eﬀects on growth that we can associate with bankconcentration. Therefore,
the sign of ψ4 is a priori ambiguous.
B. Extended Model
The approach outlined above enables us to identify an economy-wide eﬀect of bank
concentration, common to all industrial sectors. In other words, this would be the
eﬀect we would ﬁnd if we used growth rate averages, aggregated across sectors in each
3As Rajan and Zingales note, this is done “...in order to reduce the dependence on country-speciﬁc
factors, like natural resources... ” (Rajan and Zingales (1998, p. 567]).
7country. The use of industry-speciﬁc information yields instead a deeper exploration and
understanding of the role played by banking market structure for growth. This model
speciﬁcation allows us to decompose the total eﬀect of bankconcentration in ﬁrst, an
economy-wide eﬀect and second, a sector-speciﬁc eﬀect.
The extended model speciﬁcation is as follows:
Growthj,k = Constant +Φ 1 · Industry dummiesj (2)
+Φ 2 · Country controlsk
+ φ3 · Industry share of manufacturing value addedj,k
+ φ4 · Bank concentrationk
+ φ5 · (External dependencej · Bank concentrationk)
+ φ6 · (External dependencej · Bank developmentk)
+ Errorj,k.
In this extended speciﬁcation of the model we include the interaction between the level
of external ﬁnancial dependence of industry j and bankconcentration in country k.W e
test whether sectors that are more in need of external ﬁnance grow disproportionately
slower or faster if they are in a country with high bankconcentration. Following the same
arguments as above, the sign of φ5 is a priori ambiguous. As an additional control, we
also include the interaction between external ﬁnancial dependence and the level of bank
development. The coeﬃcient φ6 of this interaction term, extensively analyzed in Rajan
and Zingales (1998), is expected to be positive. As anticipated in the introduction, we
focus on the external ﬁnancial needs of younger ﬁrms (those less than ten years old).4
4Results regarding more mature ﬁrms are, however, presented in the section devoted to robustness
tests.
8C. Focusing on the Interaction
Finally, in a third model speciﬁcation we focus our attention on the analysis of the
diﬀerential eﬀect of bankconcentration across industries, captured by the interaction
term. Since we ﬁnd that bankconcentration actually has beneﬁcial eﬀects on industries
more in need of external ﬁnance, a result not obvious ex-ante, we want to be convinced
that this eﬀect is indeed robust. We thus estimate a third model speciﬁcation, where
we drop the level of bankconcentration by itself, k eeping only the interaction terms.
The reason for choosing to focus on this speciﬁcation to run robustness tests is that it is
econometrically more sound: since we are not identifying ﬁrst-order eﬀects, we can drop
the vector of country controls, and instead we can include country dummies (in addition
to the industry ones), thus eliminating possible biases caused by omitted country-speciﬁc
regressors. The model speciﬁcation is therefore as follows:
Growthj,k = Constant +Γ 1 · Industry dummiesj (3)
+Γ 2 · Country dummiesk
+ γ3 · Industry share of manufacturing value addedj,k
+ γ4 · (External dependencej · Bank developmentk)
+ γ5 · (External dependencej · Bank concentrationk)
+ Errorj,k,
where subscripts and variables are the same as described previously.
III. Data
The empirical analysis relies on our augmented version of the Rajan and Zingales data
set.5 The sample includes 41 countries and for each of them 36 industries, yielding a re-
markably large sample size. The 36 industries, as mentioned earlier, are all selected from
5The data set was kindly made available by the authors.
9the manufacturing sector. The relevant growth variable is the average (compounded)
rate of growth of real value added for each industrial sector in each country between
1980 and 1990.
Rajan and Zingales calculate the measure of external ﬁnancial dependence for each
industry for U.S. sectors, arguing that the “dependence of U.S. ﬁrms on external ﬁnance
[is] a good proxy for the demand for external funds in other countries” (Rajan and
Zingales 1998, pp. 563–65)).
Table I about here
We augment the data set to include measures of concentration of the banking sec-
tor. Speciﬁcally, for each country we calculate the sum of market shares (measured in
total assets) of the three and of the ﬁve largest banks. The data source is the IBCA-
BankScope 1997 CD, which contains detailed balance sheet information on individual
banking institutions for the period 1989 to 1996. For each country we then compute the
concentration ratios for every year in the sample for which there is exhaustive informa-
tion (the computation for some countries in some years is made unreliable since only a
small fraction of bankbalance sheets were reported.) Averages over time constitute our
measures of bankconcentration. Table I contains the list of countries in the data set
and the corresponding measures of bankconcentration. As we proceed in the descrip-
tion of the empirical results, we will introduce and describe additional variables used for
robustness tests (all variables are summarized in Table II.)
Table II about here
IV. Empirical Results
We were unable to ﬁnd data to construct the concentration measures going back
earlier than 1989. Since the growth variable refers to the decade 1980 to 1990, we
10are exposed to the potential problems that an ex-post variable could generate, such as
endogeneity. However, we are conﬁdent that in this case the ex-post determination does
not constitute an important issue. First, the market structure of the banking sector, at
the country level, does not vary substantially over such a short time period. We checked
this by analyzing for each country the pattern of variability of the concentration ratios
calculated for the 1989 to 1996 period. We found that indeed such ratios are remarkably
stable over time. For example, we calculated the range for the three-bankconcentration
ratio in each country. The cross-country median range of variation in the 1989 to 1996
period was only three percentage points. Even more telling, in about seventy percent of
the countries (27 out of 41) the three-bankratio had a variation over time of less than
ﬁve percentage points.6 To our knowledge, there are no reasons to believe that such
stability over the 1989 to 1996 period should not also be found in the contiguous 1980
to 1990 period.
In addition, we also constructed the series of the rankof the three-bankand the ﬁve-
bankconcentration ratios. In other words, we allow for the possibility that the averages
calculated over the 1989 to 1996 period are possibly diﬀerent from the ones we would
have calculated for the 1980 to 1990 period, but we require that countries keep their
relative position in the ranking. This is a less stringent condition than requiring that
concentration ratios remain unchanged. Finally, we calculate a dummy variable (high-
low concentration) as an additional alternative to our three-bankand ﬁve-bankratios.
Following the above reasoning, even though the actual values of concentration in the
earlier period may have been diﬀerent from our indices, and perhaps some rankings may
have changed as well, as long as the range of variation was not so large to make a country
shift from the high to the low concentration cluster (or vice versa), a concentration
measure constructed on 1989 to 1996 averages is very likely to be similar to the one we
6As a term of comparison, the cross-country average three-bank ratio in our sample is approximately
ﬁfty-ﬁve percent.
11would have constructed for the 1980 to 1990 period, had the data been available. In
the empirical analysis we test the robustness of the results to the use of this alternative
measures of market structure.
Table III about here
Still on the issue of endogeneity, one could also argue that bankmark et structure
simply adjusts to a level which is optimal for a country’s industrial structure. However,
this consideration overlooks the fact that there are political and institutional factors that
distort the natural development of ﬁnancial systems. Interest groups, or governments,
or both, will shape the legal, institutional and economic environment for private gains
that may not necessarily coincide with the proper development, in terms of both size and
structure, of the ﬁnancial industry.7 Moreover, in general, the market structure of the
banking sector is a favorite policy variable for reasons not necessarily related to industry
growth.8 Hence, the objective function of the regulator is such that the “optimal” level
of bankconcentration may be unrelated to that requested by the industry structure of
the economy.
Beyond this line of discussion, we resolve the concerns regarding the potential en-
dogeneity of the market structure of the banking sector using instrumental variables
(IV) estimation. We have selected as instruments two variables determining a country’s
institutional characteristics, and two variables proxying for market size. In addition to
institutional factors, it is in fact likely that for reasons of minimum scale economies,
a larger market is able to accommodate a higher number of banks. The institutional
variables are an indicator of the legal origin of a country and one concerning the extent
to which laws are enforced in a country (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
7Rajan and Zingales (1999) extensively elaborate on this argument.
8For example, the regulator often controls competition in the banking industry to prevent excessive
surplus extraction or for reasons related to the safety and soundness of the industry.
12Vishny (1997)).9 The proxies for market size are country total population and total
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), measured in U.S. dollars.10
We perform a Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test of overidentifying restrictions for
each of the regressions in the paper. The test (see Davidson and MacKinnon (1993,
pp. 237–42)) veriﬁes the null hypothesis that the introduction of IVs has no eﬀect on the
estimates of the regression’s coeﬃcients. There are two terms including the measure of
concentration in our equations, namely, the level of concentration and the interaction of
external dependence and concentration. When both terms are present in the regressions,
instruments must be used for both variables. Therefore, for each of the regressions we
perform a DWH F-test, which is reported as the bottom line in each table. If the P-
value of the F-test is below ten percent (i.e., the null hypothesis is rejected and the IVs
are jointly accepted), then IV estimates are reported. Otherwise, OLS estimates are
reported. We choose the ten percent signiﬁcance level for prudence, since we want to
correct for possible endogeneity when there is the slightest riskof its occurrence.
Anticipating our results, in the vast majority of the regressions we ﬁnd that the
test fails to reject the null hypothesis and that, even when they are used, IVs do not
particularly alter the results of the OLS estimations. Therefore, bankconcentration is
robust to the issue of endogeneity, both in level and in interaction.
A. Basic Model
In table IV we report the results of regressions based on the speciﬁcation in equation
(1), in which we add one country control variable at a time.
Table IV about here
9For another example of instrumental variable approach to tackle the issue of endogeneity of ﬁnancial
variables in growth regressions, see Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000). A time-series analysis of causality
between ﬁnancial variables and growth is in Demetriades and Hussein (1996).
10As shown in Table III, the negative correlation between bank concentration and the measures of
market size are indeed quite high, especially that with total GDP. In fact, we also tested whether by
using bank concentration we were not just capturing a market size eﬀect. The results, not reported,
show that bank concentration is robust to the inclusion of market size variables.
13The dependent variable is the average annual growth in value added for each sector
in each country, while the three-bankratio is the measure of bankconcentration. Unless
otherwise noted, the dependent variable and the measure of bankconcentration will
remain the same in all of the following regressions. The country control variables are
the level of bankdevelopment, the logarithm of per capita income in 1980, stockmark et
capitalization over GDP in 1980, an accounting standards indicator, and a measure of
the level of human capital. The measure of bankdevelopment is the commonly used
ratio between domestic credit to the private sector and GDP, and is expected to have
a positive eﬀect. Per-capita GDP captures the convergence eﬀect of the economy as a
whole to its long-run steady state, and is therefore expected to have a negative sign.
Stockmark et capitalization controls for the relative importance of alternative sources
of external ﬁnance and is expected to have a positive sign. Accounting standards is an
index reﬂecting the quality of disclosure of ﬁrms’ annual reports (see Rajan and Zingales
(1998, p. 571)). The poorer such standards, the higher the information cost that a bank
has to sustain to determine the quality of an entrepreneur. The expected sign for this
term is also positive. The level of human capital, another typical regressor in growth
equations, is measured as average number of school years in population over age 25 (as
in Barro and Lee (1993)), and is expected to have a positive eﬀect as well.
All control variables have the sign that one would expect to ﬁnd in any cross-country
growth equation. Also as expected, the share of total value added in manufacturing
is negative and signiﬁcant. The main result to highlight is that the level of bankcon-
centration has a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. The eﬀect of bankconcentration
is robust to the inclusion of the various control variables. This result lends support to
the prior that a concentrated banking industry imposes a deadweight loss in the credit
market and on the economy as a whole.
In order to gauge the economic relevance of the bankconcentration variable, we
14perform a standard comparative dynamics exercise. Speciﬁcally, we calculate the to-
tal impact on growth if we were going from a country at the 25th percentile of the
distribution of bankconcentration to a country at the 75th percentile. The eﬀect on
growth based on the estimated coeﬃcients in the regression in column (b) of Table IV
is a negative 1.5 percentage points.11 Note that the average growth across sectors is
3.6 percent (see Table II). We should not take these number at face value, since this
model speciﬁcation is exposed to the aforementioned omitted variable bias, due to the
non-inclusion of potentially important country variables. However, the overall evidence
suggests that the total eﬀect is, on average, negative and signiﬁcant, both statistically
and economically.
B. Extended Model: Economy-wide and Sector-speciﬁc Eﬀects
In Table V we report the results of regressions based on the speciﬁcation in equation
(2), in which, again, we add one country control variable at a time, and where we include
the interaction between external ﬁnancial dependence and bankconcentration, together
with that between external ﬁnancial dependence and bankdevelopment, acting as a
control. External ﬁnancial dependence refers to that of the younger ﬁrms in the data
set.
Table V about here
The level of bankconcentration by itself maintains a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃ-
cient in the regressions (a) through (d), while we highlight that the interaction coeﬃcient
11Column (b) regression has the highest number of controls that still allows us to use the largest sample
size, with 1150 observations. Column (c) and (d) regressions have more controls but the inclusion of
accounting standards and human capital brings the sample size down to 950 observations, with a loss
of nine of the original countries in the data set. The countries are Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Egypt,
Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe. We choose to present our basic results
based on the larger sample, in order to minimize informational losses (nine countries out of forty-one
represent a rather signiﬁcant twenty-two percent). Moreover, since the nine countries are all developing
countries, we want to avoid sample bias. At any rate, based on the estimates of column (d), the eﬀect
of increasing bank concentration would be a negative 2.4 percentage points.
15is instead positive and signiﬁcant. The two eﬀects of bankconcentration are robust to
the inclusion of the various control variables, all showing the expected sign.12 The
interaction between external ﬁnancial dependence and bankdevelopment becomes in-
signiﬁcant in the last three columns where, as we mentioned in footnote 11, the inclusion
of accounting standards and human capital makes nine countries drop from the sample.
The combined results are consistent with the theoretical priors. They suggest that
bankconcentration has a negative eﬀect on growth that, on average, aﬀects all sectors
indiscriminately. However, when we introduce the dimension of the intensity of external
ﬁnancial dependence, we identify an industry-speciﬁc, positive eﬀect of bankconcentra-
tion. This eﬀect is consistent with the theoretical prior that bankmark et power, by
facilitating the formation of lending relationships, enhances the growth potentials for
those sectors that are more in need of establishing such relationships. The result indi-
cates that the impact of bankconcentration on growth is not uniform across industries.
Consequently, bankconcentration has an important redistribution eﬀect. We elaborate
further on this point and the related policy implications in the following sections.
It is also worthwhile remarking that our results are shielded by a potentially im-
portant objection. External ﬁnancial dependence in the data set is measured on U.S.
sectors. However, U.S. sectors with higher external ﬁnancial dependence are those that
grew more over time. We also know that countries at a comparable level of economic
development are similar in terms of their industry structure. Therefore, it is likely that
sectors with high external ﬁnancial dependence grew more not just in the U.S. but also
in those countries similar to the U.S., i.e., the richest countries. Suppose now that,
similar to bankdevelopment, bankconcentration had a positive, high correlation with
income per capita. In that case, the ﬁnding of a positive and signiﬁcant bankconcentra-
12We also ran a regression where we included external ﬁnancial dependence by itself as a regressor.
In order to do that, however, we had to exclude the industry dummy variables. Such a regressor was
not signiﬁcant while all other coeﬃcients were unchanged.
16tion interaction, especially when the bankdevelopment interaction is insigniﬁcant, could
simply capture this positive association between external ﬁnancial dependence and the
level of economic development. However, we do not thinkthis is a matter of concern,
since there is actually no correlation in the data between bankconcentration and income
per capita (see Table III).
We also add a squared term of bankconcentration to checkfor non-linearity. As
the results in column (e) of Table V show, bankconcentration has in fact a slight
inverted-U eﬀect. The interpretation for this result is actually provided by what we
learn from the sector-speciﬁc analysis: intuitively, at low levels of concentration only the
sectors that have the lowest need to establish a lending relationship receive the maximum
beneﬁt, in that the deadweight loss from rent extraction is minimal but the potential
informational gains from establishing lending relationships are also minimal. Conversely,
at high levels of concentration only the sectors that are highly dependent on banks will
beneﬁt. The non-linearity seems to suggest that at intermediate values of concentration
the overall growth potential of the entire economy is the highest, since sectors in an
intermediate range of the distribution of external ﬁnance beneﬁt substantially, and those
at the extremes of the distribution of external ﬁnance are not highly penalized.
We evaluate the magnitude of the total eﬀect of bankconcentration on economic
growth, decomposed in the ﬁrst-order, economy-wide eﬀect and the second-order, sector-
speciﬁc ones. More precisely, we calculate the eﬀect on growth of sectors with diﬀerent
levels of external ﬁnancial dependence if we went from a level at the 25th percentile to
one at the 75th percentile of the distribution of bankconcentration. As we did above,
we perform this calculation based on the estimation results of the regression in column
(b) of Table V. The economy-wide eﬀect is a negative 2.6 percent. For the sector at the
25th percentile of the distribution of external ﬁnancial dependence (Wood products),
17the sector-speciﬁc eﬀect is a positive 0.8 percent.13 The net eﬀect for such sector is thus
around minus 1.7 percentage points.14 If we perform this calculation for other sectors,
the second order eﬀect becomes stronger as the intensity of external ﬁnancial dependence
increases.15 Indeed, the net eﬀect actually turns positive for those sectors at the upper
tail of the distribution.16
V. Statistical Robustness Tests
We now turn to present a large battery of robustness tests, for which we focus on
the speciﬁcation in equation (3). Nevertheless, the reader must rest assured that all the
pertinent robustness tests have also been conducted on the ﬁrst-order eﬀect, also shown
to be very robust. When relevant, we do mention or report the result of tests carried
out on the equation (2) model speciﬁcation.
Table VI about here
Table VI reports in column (a) the estimation results for the benchmarkequation
(3). The share of total value added in manufacturing remains negative and signiﬁcant,
and the interaction between external dependence and bankdevelopment positive and
signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient of the interaction between external ﬁnancial dependence and
bankconcentration is still positive and signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level.
Based on the results of this model speciﬁcation, the sector at the 25th percentile of
the external ﬁnancial dependence distribution would receive a positive eﬀect translating
13The distribution of external ﬁnancial dependence for young ﬁrms has virtually identical mean and
median. The median is equal to 0.66 and the mean equal to 0.67.
14Based on the estimates of column (d) regression, the ﬁrst-order eﬀect would be a negative 4.5 percent
and the second-order eﬀect a positive one percent, with a net eﬀect of around minus 3.5 percentage
points. Remember, however, the remarks in Footnote 11 about sample size.
15For example, for the sector at the 75th percentile of the distribution (Ship), the second order eﬀect,
calculated on column (b) coeﬃcients, is estimated to be a positive 1.9 percent, bringing the net eﬀect
to minus 0.7 percentage points.
16For example, based on column (b) coeﬃcients, the net eﬀect of bank concentration would be positive
for sectors such as Glass, Professional goods and Drugs.
18in 0.9 percent of higher growth in going from a country at the 25th percentile of the
distribution of bankconcentration to a country at the 75th percentile. A sector at the
75th percentile would receive instead a positive eﬀect of two percent higher growth.
These results conﬁrm the robustness of those obtained with the model speciﬁcation of
equation (2). Recall, however, that all sectors are also subject to the negative economy-
wide eﬀect, which is not identiﬁable with this model speciﬁcation. The information on
the diﬀerent sector-speciﬁc eﬀect allows us to gauge the impact of bankconcentration
on the size distribution across industrial sectors. Speciﬁcally, we learn that the growth
diﬀerential between an industrial sector at the 75th percentile and one at the 25th
percentile of the distribution of external ﬁnancial dependence for younger ﬁrms, if we
were going from a country at the 25th percentile of the distribution of bankconcentration
to a country at the 75th percentile is estimated to be about 2 − 0.9=1 .1 percentage
points on an annual basis. Again recalling that the average growth over all sectors is
3.6 percent, this redistribution eﬀect of bankconcentration appears to be economically
signiﬁcant.
A. Do the Results Depend on the Choice of the Concentration Measure?
We ﬁrst checkwhether the three-bankratio calculated over the 1989 to 1996 period
is an adequate measure of concentration. In column (b) of Table VI, the concentration
measure is the rankof the three-bankratio, while in column (c) is the high-low con-
centration dummy for the three-bankratio. 17 In column (d) we use the ﬁve-bankratio,
to checkthat the results would not depend on the arbitrary choice of computing the
concentration measure as the sum of the market shares of the top three banks only. The
strong similarity of the results obtained with these alternative measures suggests that
17For the calculation of the concentration dummy, countries were divided between those with a value
of the ratio below and those above a value equal to 0.70, which is what would be considered high
concentration, for example, in the U.S. banking industry (see, e.g., Calem and Carlino (1991)). An
alternative speciﬁcation, which gave unchanged results and is not reported in the table, divided the
countries around the median of the distribution (0.57).
19the three-bankratio computed for the 1989 to 1996 period is a reliable measure for our
analysis.
In what follows we therefore continue to present regression results using the three-
bankconcentration ratio calculated over the 1989 to 1996 period as our benchmark
measure of banking market structure.
B. Omitted Variables
We test whether the term of interaction of bankconcentration is signiﬁcant when
we omit the bankdevelopment interaction from the basic model speciﬁcation. The
results, reported in column (a) of Table VII, show that the concentration variable remains
positive and signiﬁcant at the ten percent level.18
Table VII about here
Subsequently, we checkwhether the bankconcentration interaction variable is still
signiﬁcant after controlling for the relative importance of alternative sources of external
ﬁnance. We therefore start by adding the interaction between external dependence and
the size of stockmark et capitalization over GDP. The coeﬃcient is expected to have a
positive sign. The results in Table VII, column (b), show that this coeﬃcient is indeed
positive, although not signiﬁcant. The bankconcentration term is still positive and
signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level, with an estimated coeﬃcient close in magnitude to
the one in the baseline regression (column (b), Table VI).
In column (c) of Table VII we report the results of a regression where we add the in-
teraction between external dependence and the logarithm of per-capita income in 1980.
There is a concern that the interaction term of bankdevelopment in our basic speciﬁca-
tion may be proxying for the general level of economic development of a country. The
18We note a decrease in the estimated coeﬃcient, from 0.063 to 0.048. This is likely to be the result
of an omitted variable bias. Performing a bias analysis (see, e.g., Berndt (1991, p. 322) it is indeed
conﬁrmed that the omission of the bank development variable determines a downward bias on the
coeﬃcient of bank concentration.
20simple correlation between bankdevelopment and per-capita income, 0 .56 (reported in
Table III), may justify this concern. The coeﬃcient of the bankconcentration interac-
tion remains positive and is signiﬁcant at the ten percent level. Conﬁrming the existence
of some collinearity, the bankdevelopment and the income interaction terms have the
expected sign but neither is signiﬁcant.19
Finally, we add to the basic regression the interaction between external ﬁnancial
dependence and the measure of accounting standards. The expected sign for this term
of interaction is positive. Column (d) in Table VII presents the results of this augmented
speciﬁcation of the model. The coeﬃcient of bankconcentration is still positive and
signiﬁcant, even though the size of the estimated coeﬃcient decreases from 0.063 to
0.035. The two coeﬃcients, however, are not immediately comparable, again due to
the fact that by including the accounting standard variable the number of observations
decreases from 1150 to 984.20
C. Outliers
A general concern is that the results based on these growth regressions could be
driven by the exceptional performance of some countries (for example, Southeast Asian
countries) or certain industrial sectors in particular countries, which could not be fully
captured by the inclusions of the country and sector dummies. This should not aﬀect our
analysis, since the sample in the Rajan and Zingales data set does not include countries
such as Taiwan or Hong Kong. In addition, the series of growth in value added censors
from above sectors that, on average, grew more than 100 percent annually in the 1980
to 1990 period. To be sure, we run a regression dropping the censored observations
19If we run an equation (3) regression where we replace the bank development interaction term with
the income level interaction term, the bank concentration interaction maintains its sign, signiﬁcance
and magnitude as well.
20If we run the equation (3) regression on the restricted sample excluding records for these countries,
the coeﬃcient of the bank concentration variable is equal to 0.042, signiﬁcant at the one percent level.
As pointed out earlier, we choose to present our basic results based on the larger sample, in order to
minimize informational losses and sample bias.
21altogether.21 The results, reported in column (e) of Table VII, show that the bank
concentration interaction becomes signiﬁcant at the one percent level, although with a
smaller coeﬃcient. The coeﬃcient of the bankdevelopment interaction, signiﬁcant now
at the ten percent level only, decreases as well.
In addition, we evaluate whether the results are sensitive to high and low values in
the distribution of young ﬁrms’ external ﬁnancial dependence. We use a dummy variable
to separate sectors above the median from those below the median of the distribution
of external ﬁnancial dependence and redeﬁne the bankconcentration interaction term
accordingly. The results of this regression are reported in column (f) of Table VII.
They show that the interaction term is positive and highly signiﬁcant while the dummy
variable term is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This is interpreted as conﬁrming
that the eﬀect of bankconcentration is stable across the entire sample.
VI. Economic Robustness Tests
A. Tests on Mature Firms
We also investigate the role of bankconcentration for the ﬁnancial needs of the more
mature ﬁrms in the data set, that is, establishments more than ten years old. As we
mentioned earlier, the external ﬁnancial needs of this category of ﬁrms are much lower
than for younger ones. Moreover, the problem of information acquisition on established
ﬁrms is less severe than for younger ﬁrms. Therefore, focusing speciﬁcally on mature
ﬁrms, we might expect a less important eﬀect of bankconcentration on industrial growth.
In the ﬁrst column of Table VIII we report the results of the third model speciﬁcation,
this time calculating the terms of interaction using the external ﬁnancial dependence of
mature ﬁrms.
Table VIII about here
21We thank Rob Bliss for suggesting this and other outlier tests.
22The bankconcentration term is still positive and signiﬁcant. However, the economic
eﬀect on growth is half the size of that determined on young ﬁrms: the growth diﬀerential
between an industrial sector at the 75th percentile and one at the 25th percentile of the
distribution of external ﬁnancial dependence for mature ﬁrms, if we were going from a
country at the 25th percentile of the distribution of bankconcentration, to a country at
the 75th percentile, is estimated to be about 0.5 percentage points on an annual basis.
This is much lower (the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant) than the growth diﬀerential
for young ﬁrms, which, as reported above, is instead 1.1 percentage points.
Among the mature ﬁrms, those that have already grown substantially and are well
established are likely to receive minor beneﬁts from a banking relationship, and are
therefore more likely to be exposed to the rent extraction activity of a concentrated
banking sector. Therefore, we perform an additional test on mature ﬁrms, splitting
the sample between large and small sectors, i.e., those sectors in each country that had
a share of value added in manufacturing above the country median, and those below.
Columns (b) and (c) of Table VIII report the results for the two subsets. The bank
concentration interaction term continues to be positive and signiﬁcant for the sectors
below the median. For sectors above the median the coeﬃcient is positive but no longer
signiﬁcant.
In summary, bankconcentration appears to have a positive eﬀect on growth of sectors
that are more in need of external ﬁnance. Consistent with theory, the economic impact is
more pronounced for younger ﬁrms than for more mature ones. The dominating positive
eﬀect of bankconcentration seems to disappear only when we focus on a particular subset
of the more mature ﬁrms.
B. Market Contestability
Concentration ratios are widely used in empirical analysis to proxy for competitive
23conduct.22 However, the potential weakness of this measure is that if markets are con-
testable, market structure does not necessarily aﬀect conduct. In a cross-country study,
market contestability can be gauged in terms of the ability of foreign banks to access
domestic markets. We can test whether the actual presence of foreign banks aﬀects the
relationship between bankconcentration and industry growth using data on the share
of total domestic assets owned by foreign banks (taken from Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Levine
(1999)), and on the fraction of foreign banks over the total number of banks (taken from
Claessens, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1998)). Admittedly, such measures may not
capture the eﬀect on the conduct of domestic banks of a potential threat of entry, which
is what contestability is more about. On the other hand “the threat of foreign bank
entry may not be credible in the absence of actual entry” (Claessens, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt
and Huizinga (1998, p. 7)).
Data show a limited presence of foreign banks in most of the countries in the sample.
For instance, the median share of assets owned by foreign banks is six percent (the 75th
percentile is 14 percent). At the same time, in terms of the number of foreign banks
over the total, perhaps a better indicator of the potentials for entry, the median fraction
is a more substantial 24 percent. The relatively low weight of foreign banks in most
countries may be due to the existence of administrative barriers to entry that were or
still are in place in developing countries, where hostility toward foreign institutions can
be traced backto the experience of colonialism (Vittas (1992)). Such restrictions are
found in developed countries as well. For example, prior to 1993, countries that are now
members of the European Union (EU) signiﬁcantly restricted the entry of foreign banks.
Such restrictions are still in place with respect to banks from non-EU countries.23
22Recent developments in empirical industrial organization have proposed alternative measures of
market power, which could be used instead of the traditional concentration ratios (see, e.g., Bresnahan
(1991). Such measures are identiﬁed through econometric estimation of industry’s demand and supply
conditions. The major drawback of such an alternative approach is the need for extensive data, which
is only available for the most developed countries.
23One can also argue that besides regulatory restrictions, informational barriers play an important
24We generate a dummy variable equal to one for countries with both a three-bankratio
and a foreign share of bankassets above their medians. These are countries where, given
the relatively high presence of foreign banks, a high concentration ratio may overestimate
the actual degree of monopoly power. We run an equation (3) regression where we add
the product of the dummy with the concentration interaction term. The results, in
column (a) of Table IX, show that the concentration interaction alone is still positive
and signiﬁcant, while the dummy term is not.
Table IX about here
This suggests that even if the concentration measure may be biased upward in some
countries, such bias is not driving the main ﬁndings.24
C. Under-reporting Bias
We use data of foreign banking penetration to take into account another potential
source of bias in the concentration variable. As described in Section III, the concen-
tration ratios are calculated using the IBCA data set. Such a data set collects balance
sheet items for all banks that report such information. While the percentage of banks
reporting is very high, it is still possible to introduce a bias due to under-reporting. In
particular, Beck, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Levine (1999) observe that “...[using these data]
the concentration measure might be biased upwards for developing countries, if foreign
and large banks are more likely to report than domestic and smaller banks.” To ad-
role as well in preventing a banking market from being contestable. The existence of informational
barriers is discussed, and evidence is provided, e.g., in Berger, Bonime, Covitz and Hancock (1999).
Some casual evidence is also provided by the observation that despite the removal of the aforementioned
regulatory barriers to entry among EU countries, the actual presence of banks from other EU countries
is still very limited, averaging about ﬁve percent of total bank assets across country (European Central
Bank (1999)).
24As an alternative test, we dropped the records for those countries altogether and ran a regression
on the restricted sample. We also repeated these tests with diﬀerent cutoﬀs in the bank concentration
and foreign share distributions, and we also used the proportion of foreign banks in place of foreign
share. Similar tests of robustness were also performed on the equation (2) model speciﬁcation. The
results, available upon request, are in all instances qualitatively identical, indicating an eﬀect of bank
concentration on industrial growth robust to the issue of market contestability.
25dress this problem, we generate a dummy variable equal to one for countries below the
median in per-capita GDP and above the median in the foreign bankshare, in order to
isolate those countries where the concentration measure is more likely to be biased due
to under-reporting. We then run regressions adding the product of the dummy with the
bankconcentration interaction term. While the bankconcentration term alone remains
signiﬁcant, the dummy term is not signiﬁcant, suggesting that the under-reporting bias
is not a problem (see column (b), Table 9).25
D .U s i n gM e a s u r e so fB a n kE ﬃ c i e n c y
We use interest margins and overhead costs as alternative measures of competition.
Using cross-country data from Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1998), we ﬁnd that the
concentration measure is not correlated with either variable (see Table III). We run
regressions using either one in place of bankconcentration, but we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant
results. An explanation is that interest margins and overhead costs are measures of
bankeﬃciency that, in a cross-country analysis, are lik ely to be aﬀected by country-
speciﬁc factors. Consistent with this argument, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1998),
in a cross-country analysis ﬁnd that, in fact, factors such as macroeconomic conditions,
banktaxation, deposit insurance, legal structure, and other institutional indicators are
very important in the determination of interest margins and overhead costs. They also
conﬁrm that bankconcentration, at the cross-country level, is only mildly related to
interest margins and to overhead costs. Hence, trying to trace information on bank
competitive conduct via interest margins or overhead costs is in this case likely to yield
spurious results. For instance, relatively higher margins in one country do not necessarily
imply relatively higher banking market power.
25The same results are obtained using the proportion of foreign banks in place of foreign share.
26VII. Reﬁnements and Extensions
A. State-owned Banks
Another potential criticism of our use of the concentration ratios is that in some
countries a large proportion of banks is owned by the government. In such cases, where
the same subject owns many banks, those banks might act as a cartel. As a consequence,
the concentration measure in some countries could underestimate the actual market
power. At the same time, it is also plausible to argue that public banks may not
necessarily be proﬁt maximizers and may not have an incentive to establish lending
relationships with potentially proﬁtable enterprises.
Beck, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Levine (1999) and Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Levine (1999)
collect cross-country information on state ownership in the banking sector. We generate
a dummy variable equal to one if the share of state-owned banks is above a certain
threshold to single out countries with a signiﬁcant government presence in the banking
sector.26 Then we test for a non-linear response to the concentration interaction term in
the case where state ownership is particularly high. The coeﬃcient of the product of the
dummy and the concentration interaction term is negative, signiﬁcant and almost the
same in absolute value as the concentration interaction term alone (column (c) in Table
IX). Hence, the positive eﬀect of bankconcentration appears to be oﬀset in countries
with a dominant government presence in the banking industry.
To explore further, we also run regressions where we add the interaction between
external ﬁnancial dependence and state ownership. The concentration interaction term
is still signiﬁcant, with a slightly decreased coeﬃcient. The state ownership interac-
tion is negative and signiﬁcant (column (d) in Table IX). Interestingly enough, in the
extended model speciﬁcation we notice that even the level of bankdevelopment turns
26We set the threshold at 50 percent, 60 percent and 70 percent, obtaining virtually identical results.
The regression described in the text is that with the threshold at 60 percent.
27insigniﬁcant when we control for the degree of state ownership (column (e) in Table IX),
thus suggesting a general negative impact associated with the presence of the state in
the credit market.
B. Bank Powers
The eﬀect of bankmonopoly power may diﬀer depending on the regulatory environ-
ment in which banks operate in a country. As mentioned in Section I, if a bank were
allowed to ﬁnance ﬁrms through equity, then even under perfect competition it would
have an incentive to establish close relationships. Hence, in a world where banks are
less constrained in their ﬁnancing choices, we may expect the positive eﬀect of banking
concentration on growth to be less important.
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2000) compile information across countries on the re-
strictions for banks in terms of their ability to write contracts. They summarize this
information in a quantitative indicator ranging from one (broadest powers) to four (nar-
rowest powers). We add to the model an interaction between this measure of bank
powers and ﬁnancial dependence. The bankconcentration interaction remains highly
signiﬁcant, while the bankdevelopment interaction loses signiﬁcance.
Table X about here
The bankpowers interaction is not signiﬁcant (column (a) of Table X). 27 We also
add both bankpowers alone and the interaction to the equation (2) model. Both bank
concentration alone and its interaction are highly signiﬁcant while the bankpowers
variables are not signiﬁcant (column (b) of Table X).
As an additional test on the equation (2) model we also include an interaction of
the level of bankconcentration with bankpowers, to see if the ﬁrst-order negative eﬀect
27We also generate a dummy variable equal to one if bank powers are very broad (below the median).
We then add the product of the dummy and the concentration-dependence interaction to the regression.
This new term is also not signiﬁcant.
28of concentration on industrial growth diﬀers across countries with diﬀerent regulatory
restrictions. One could argue, for example, that if banks were allowed to operate in
multiple lines of business, they would face increasing cross-markets competitive pressure
that could reduce their ability to extract rent. The result (column (c), Table X) shows,
however, that this interaction is not signiﬁcant as well. In sum, there is not evidence from
this data set that bankregulatory restrictions have a direct impact on the relationship
between banking market structure and growth.
C. Does Bank Concentration Lead to Industry Concentration?
Another relevant issue is whether bankconcentration causes ﬁnancially dependent
industries to become concentrated, thus enabling ﬁrms to earn monopoly proﬁts. Banks
may act as a barrier to entry by privileging incumbents, with whom they already estab-
lished relationships, over new entrants.28 Since we measure industrial growth in terms of
value added, under such a scenario we could observe positive growth due to an increase
in proﬁts and not necessarily in production, with important welfare implications.
The Rajan and Zingales data set contains information on growth in the number of
establishments and growth in the average size of existing establishments that can be
used to test this hypothesis. If bankconcentration induces industry concentration, and
thus industry monopoly proﬁts, then we should ﬁnd that in those sectors that are more
dependent on external ﬁnance there is a relatively slower growth in the number of new
establishments, and in association with it a relatively faster growth in the average size
of existing establishments. In our model speciﬁcation, this implies that the hypothesis
that bankconcentration induces industry concentration is consistent with the ﬁnding
that the interaction between bankconcentration and external ﬁnancial dependence is
negative and signiﬁcant in a regression with growth in number of establishments as
28In his study of Italian industrialization at the turn of the past century, Cohen (1967, p. 363) reports
the relation between a quasi-monopolistic banking industry and “...the emergence of concentration of
ownership and control in the new and rapidly growing sectors of the industrial structure.”
29dependent variable, and positive and signiﬁcant in a regression with growth in average
size as dependent variable.
We ﬁrst run regressions with growth in number of establishments as the dependent
variable. The results in column (d) of Table X show that while the level of concentration
is negative and signiﬁcant, the interaction term is positive and signiﬁcant. Column (e)
shows that the interaction term remains positive and signiﬁcant even when we drop the
regressors in level and we can introduce country dummies.
We then use growth in average size as the dependent variable. The results of these
regressions are reported in column (f) and (g) of Table X. In both model speciﬁcations
the interaction term is never signiﬁcant. Overall, the evidence does not support the
argument that bankconcentration may enhance industry concentration. The results
thus indicate that growth in value added is a good proxy for growth in output.
VIII. Concluding Remarks
Important recent contributions have established with reasonable conﬁdence that ﬁ-
nancial development, characterized by a sizeable banking sector, matters for economic
growth. The next important step in the research agenda involves delving deeper into
the micro details governing the actual functioning of the ﬁnance-growth nexus. Beyond
a “black-box” characterization of the banking sector, implicit in focusing on its relative
size only, there is a much more complex web of banks and other institutions interacting
in the credit markets. The various attributes of such a system are likely to have a qual-
ifying impact on the ﬁnance-growth relationship. The market structure of the banking
industry, reﬂecting its competitive conditions, is, in our opinion, one such attribute.
The ﬁndings in our paper suggest a non-trivial impact of bankconcentration on in-
dustrial growth. There is evidence that bankconcentration has a ﬁrst-order negative
eﬀect on growth. This ﬁnding is consistent with the theoretical prediction that higher
30bankconcentration results in a lower amount of credit available in the economy as a
whole. Regardless of their external ﬁnancial dependence, this eﬀect is common to all
industrial sectors. However, we also ﬁnd evidence that bankconcentration has a het-
erogeneous eﬀect across industries. In particular, sectors that are more dependent on
external ﬁnance enjoy a beneﬁcial eﬀect from a concentrated banking sector. This posi-
tive eﬀect could actually more than compensate the direct, negative eﬀect on quantities.
This ﬁnding supports models predicting that concentration of market power in banking
facilitates the development of lending relationships, which have in turn an enhancing
eﬀect on ﬁrms’ growth.
The main insights of this study are that ﬁrst, at least maintaining the focus on the
eﬀects on industrial growth, there does not seem to be a Pareto-dominant policy regard-
ing the optimal banking market structure: competition in banking does not necessarily
dominate monopoly, and vice versa. Second, depending on the level of bankconcentra-
tion, and ceteris paribus, individual industries will grow at diﬀerent speeds. Therefore,
banking market structure plays an important role in shaping the cross-industry size dis-
tribution within a country. Moreover, since bankconcentration plays a more substantial
role for growth by facilitating credit access of younger ﬁrms, and to the extent that
investment by younger ﬁrms is more likely to introduce innovative technologies, banking
market structure should have an impact on the pace of technological progress.
The results of the paper have relevance for developing countries, where government-
sponsored programs, such as development banks (see Armendariz de Aghion (1999))
or micro banking (see Morduch (1999)), which aﬀect credit market structure, aim at
providing the conditions for convergence to higher levels of welfare. Yet, our ﬁndings
are also relevant for developed countries where we witness important regulatory reforms
and signiﬁcant structural transformations of the banking industry.
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35Table I
List of Countries and Bank Concentration Ratios
For each country we calculated the sum of market shares (measured in total assets) of the three and
the ﬁve largest banks. The data on individual banking institutions for each country in the sample, are
from the IBCA-BankScope 1997 CD for the period 1989–1996. The values reported are averages over
the sample period. Note that data about the United States are not used in any of the regressions; we
report them only for sake of completeness.
Country 3-Bank 5-Bank Country 3-Bank 5-Bank
Australia 0.60 0.80 Korea 0.28 0.44
Austria 0.42 0.55 Malaysia 0.44 0.54
Bangladesh 0.62 0.75 Mexico 0.53 0.66
Belgium 0.49 0.73 Morocco 0.57 0.79
Brazil 0.40 0.50 Netherlands 0.77 0.88
Canada 0.57 0.84 New Zealand 0.75 0.99
Chile 0.45 0.62 Norway 0.60 0.74
Colombia 0.35 0.54 Pakistan 0.71 0.90
Costa Rica 0.71 0.82 Peru 0.64 0.76
Denmark 0.74 0.82 Philippines 0.40 0.56
Egypt 0.58 0.73 Portugal 0.46 0.63
Finland 0.85 0.98 Singapore 0.61 0.83
France 0.28 0.44 South Africa 0.69 0.90
Germany 0.27 0.39 Spain 0.34 0.50
Greece 0.79 0.91 Sri Lanka 0.75 0.89
India 0.40 0.51 Sweden 0.71 0.94
Israel 0.79 0.94 Turkey 0.41 0.56
Italy 0.24 0.38 United Kingdom 0.50 0.65
Japan 0.21 0.32 United States 0.15 0.20
Jordan 0.87 0.94 Venezuela 0.47 0.62














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Regressions with Financial Needs of Old Establishments
The dependent variable in all regressions is the average (compounded) rate of growth of real value
added for each industrial sector in each country between 1980 and 1990. In all regressions, the fraction
of value added is industry j’s share of manufacturing in country k; external ﬁnancial dependence refers
to the borrowing needs of establishments more than ten years old. Bank development is the ratio of
private domestic credit to GDP. Bank concentration is the three-bank ratio. The ﬁrst column is a
regression of the entire sample; the second regression only considers sectors whose share of value added
in manufacturing in their country is above the median, while the third column reports a regression of
sectors whose share of value added is below the median. Other regressors included are country dummies
and industry dummies, but we do not report their coeﬃcient estimates. Heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic tests the null that the
use of instrumental variables does not change the estimation outcome. We report IV estimates when
the test is rejected at the 10 percent level or less. Instruments are: rule of law, legal origin, total GDP,
and population.
All ﬁrms Large sectors Small sectors
Regressors (a) (b) (c)
Fraction of value addedj,k -0.898*** -0.661*** -5.945***
(0.282) (0.235) (1.790)
External dependencej · Bank developmentk 0.114*** 0.303*** 0.091**
(0.037) (0.108) (0.045)
External dependencej · Bank concentrationk 0.100** 0.023 0.120*
(0.048) (0.090) (0.066)
R2 0.282 0.507 0.351
Observations 1112 535 577
Durbin− Wu− Hausman 0.60 2.56 0.08
* indicates rejection of the null at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level, ** indicates 5 percent signiﬁcance
level, and *** indicates 1 percent signiﬁcance level.
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